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Abstract. The regulatory body, established to ensure safety of nuclear facilities, is expected to make right decisions and provide appropriate regulations 
for the nuclear industry. The traditional manner of its activity has been based on a deterministic approach to safety analyses. However, increased maturity 
of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) makes it complementary to deterministic studies. The new IAEA concept, described in this article, is to apply 
an integrated approach by combining both deterministic and probabilistic insights with other requirements affecting the decision making process. 
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ZINTEGROWANY PROCES DECYZYJNY UWZGLĘDNIAJĄCY RYZYKO 
W PRZEMYŚLE JĄDROWYM 
Streszczenie. Organ regulacyjny, powołany w celu zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa jądrowego, jest odpowiedzialny za podejmowanie decyzji i wprowadzanie 
rozporządzeń dla przemysłu jądrowego. Tradycyjny sposób jego funkcjonowania opiera się na deterministycznym podejściu do analiz bezpieczeństwa. 
Rozwój analiz probabilistycznych (PSA) sprawia jednak, iż są one traktowane jako podejście komplementarne. Nowa koncepcja IAEA, opisana 
w tym artykule, polega na zintegrowanym podejściu, uwzględniającym analizy deterministyczne, probabilistyczne i inne aspekty procesu decyzyjnego. 
Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo jądrowe, proces decyzyjny, ryzyko, probabilistyczne analizy bezpieczeństwa (PSA), deterministyczne analizy bezpieczeństwa (DSA) 
 
Introduction 
All over the world a nuclear industry structure is organized 
in a similar manner, meaning its stakeholders are usually: 
regulatory body, utility (investor) and technology vendor. 
The utility, owning or operating a nuclear power plant (NPP), 
is responsible for its safety throughout its lifetime, which means 
effective control of nuclear radiation, radioactive waste 
and its transport within the country. For this purpose a nuclear law 
has to be enacted first and a regulatory body has to be established 
to enforce the law and to control if the law is obeyed by nuclear 
facility operators [12]. 
The major regulatory body responsibilities and functions can 
be briefly described as authorization, review and assessment, 
inspection and enforcement, and development of regulations 
and guides [24]. Authorisation means granting a written 
permission by the regulator for an operator to perform specific 
nuclear activities, based on the national legislation, which 
includes, for example, necessary licensing, certification 
and registration. After the authorisation process, the operator 
of the nuclear facility is continuously supervised by the regulatory 
body, which determines whether the operator’s activity ensures 
that the facility complies, throughout its life cycle, with the safety 
objectives, safety principles, and safety criteria approved 
by the national regulations. The regulatory body conducts 
inspections to check independently and satisfy itself that 
the operator is in compliance with the requirements set out 
in the authorization and regulations. If non-compliance 
with conditions of the authorization is demonstrated the regulatory 
body applies appropriate sanctions against the operator, including 
cancelation of the licence for nuclear activity. Consequently, 
development of appropriate regulations and guides plays a crucial 
role in the context of the relationship between nuclear facility 
operator and regulatory body. These documents are created  
by the national regulatory authority regarding to the indications 
and standards provided by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) headquartered in Vienna, Austria. 
However, the role of the IAEA is limited to support, not 
to supervise, the regulation development process in the Member 
States. Thus the regulatory body is responsible for the nuclear law 
within the country, while the IAEA provides only the general 
safety standards and indications that can be adopted 
by the national authority. These standards are issued as the Safety 
Standards Series and categorised into Safety Fundamentals, Safety 
Requirements and Safety Guides. Moreover, the reports on safety 
in nuclear facilities and activities are issued in other publication 
series, in particular the Safety Reports Series, the Technical 
Reports Series, the Training Course Series etc. While sets 
of the IAEA reports aim to prevent accidents, there are also 
publications on security issues developed as the Nuclear Security 
Series, which goal is to reduce the threat of terrorist acts causing 
intentional damage to the nuclear facility. Since interfaces 
between safety and security issues exist, appropriate measures 
have to be taken to achieve both objectives in an optimal 
manner [35]. 
Besides of a good legislation, the regulatory body is expected 
to consider results of specialised safety analyses, performed 
in order to support decision making process on both new reactor 
licencing and nuclear safety of existing facilities. Making right 
decisions in this field is in fact the mission of the regulatory body, 
which is established to ensure that the safety of the public 
and of the operating staff of nuclear facilities is protected [22]. 
Although, the regulatory body usually has an internal group 
qualified to prepare some of required safety studies, 
it is a common practice to delegate the whole safety evaluation 
to the independent organization which, from now on, gains status 
of the Technical Support Organization (TSO). However, in any 
case when the TSO performs safety analysis on the request 
of the regulator, the final decision and ultimate responsibility 
always lies in the competences of the President of the regulatory 
organization. Thus the regulatory body never delegates 
its competences in the decision making on nuclear safety to any 
external organization including TSO. The role of TSO can 
be played either by one or several institutions i.e. university 
laboratories, nuclear research centres and all other units qualified 
to perform regularly the comprehensive assessments of nuclear 
safety or even independent specialists in the relevant fields 
if necessary. Thus the TSO model can be slightly different, 
depending on the country, while its main tasks in supporting 
the regulatory body usually stay the same all over the world. 
Besides of safety assessment, TSO can also assist in developing 
nuclear regulations, conducting technical inspections and, in case 
of an accident, it is expected to advise on the possible 
countermeasures [5, 6, 9]. 
Although, in some countries it is allowed to provide technical 
support for both the regulatory body and the utility at the same 
time and by the same organization, in general it is not 
recommended due to additional requirements that have 
to be fulfilled, i.e. political and economic independence of TSO 
has to be ensured. Therefore TSO should be required 
to demonstrate that there are no conflicts of interest in its activity. 
Moreover, it usually means that no one of TSO staff should work 
for both parties in the same subject area so as to avoid reviewing 
one's own results and guarantee independence of the analysis. 
Therefore, it is a good practice to delegate different persons and 
choose the alternative methods to be used for the two sides [15]. 
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However, it is the most transparent way to establish two separate 
TSO structures, one for the regulator and another one 
for the utility. 
Another issue is the role of TSO in public information 
and social debate transparency, especially during licensing of new 
reactors and nuclear power plant construction. These activities 
have always been of special interest to the media and the public 
opinion because of risks associated with their implementation. 
Public debate is recognized as an important, thus the TSO could 
participate in an open discussion next to the Government, local 
decision making bodies and other groups of interest. Nevertheless, 
it is crucial for TSO to maintain its neutrality and independence. 
Therefore, its role in the public debate is somewhat limited e.g. 
it cannot argue in favour of or against any specific solution 
or concept [15]. On the other hand, the TSO is able to supply 
the background information for both the decision makers 
and the public. In particular, the decision makers should be well 
informed about risks associated with various options to choose 
from, when it comes to the nuclear safety assurance. 
1. Perception and evaluation of the nuclear risks 
How people view risks and apply value judgments seems 
to be the most challenging factor of the decision making based 
on risk. The way we all treat risks depends on our perception 
of how they relate to us and the things we value. It has been found 
that there is a wide range of factors influencing this perception. 
Particularly important for man-made hazards are: how well 
the process (giving rise to the hazard) is understood, 
how equitably the danger is distributed and how well individuals 
can control their exposure and whether risk is assumed voluntarily 
[19]. 
Many researchers argue that the concept of risk is strongly 
shaped by human minds and culture. It may include the prospect 
of physical harm and other factors, such as ethical and social 
considerations, and even the degree of trust in the ability of those 
creating the risk (or in the regulator) in ensuring that adequate 
preventive and protective measures are in place for controlling 
the risks. For many new hazards, high quality risk assessments 
by leaders in the field often fail to reassure people even using 
all available data and best science and technology. The other thing 
is that many of risk assessments cannot be undertaken without 
making a number of assumptions such as the relative values 
of risks and benefits or even the scope of the study. 
The studies have established that hazards give rise to concerns 
which can be put into two broad categories: the individual 
and societal. The individual concerns relate to how individuals see 
the risk from a particular hazard affecting them and things they 
value personally. Individuals may be willing to live with a risk 
that they do not regard as negligible, if it secures them or society 
certain benefits, they would want such risks to be kept low 
and clearly controlled. Societal concerns cover the risks from 
hazards which impact on society and which, if realized, could 
have adverse repercussions for the institutions responsible 
for putting in place the provisions and arrangements for protecting 
people, e.g. Parliament or the Government. This type of concern 
is often associated with hazards that give rise to risks which, were 
they to materialize, could provoke a socio-political response, e.g. 
risk of events causing widespread or large scale detriment  
or the occurrence of multiple fatalities in a single event. Typical 
examples relate to nuclear power generation, railway travel, 
or the genetic modification of organism. 
In order to specify the safety goals in a quantitative manner, 
concrete numerical values describing the level of different risk 
indicators have to be evaluated first. For that purpose the common 
concept of risk must be expressed in more mathematical terms. 
Thus the generally accepted definition of risk is described 
by the equation below: 
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where Ri is the risk associated with an accident sequence i, while 
Pi describes the probability of the sequence i and Ci specifies 
the magnitude of the consequences corresponding 
to its occurrence. 
When the consequences from an accident sequence i can 
be specified by a continuum of outcomes between x and x + Δx, 
the risk density Ri(x) of magnitude Ci(x) can be defined [10]. 
In such a case usually more important becomes the risk 
of damages exceeding the acceptable magnitude Ci(X). This risk 
is the complementary cumulative distribution function for accident 
sequence i, described by the equation below: 
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where Cij(x) includes a variety of predicted consequences of type j 
caused by the event sequence i. This factor is especially important 
in the case of severe release of radioactivity, when more than one 
type of potential damage could occur and they all have to be taken 
into account during the nuclear risks management [10]. 
Risks, generated by nuclear facilities, can be analyzed 
in details by making use of PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) 
methodology. It includes identification of possible initiating 
events leading to the potential accident, specification of expected 
accident scenarios as well as an estimation of their probability 
and consequences. The PSA methodology has been elaborated 
in the 70's and it is being used and developed until now [38]. 
By using these methods the individual and societal risk profile 
of installation can be obtained and compared with current 
standards and required criteria [2, 21, 39]. 
It should be emphasised that the individual risk estimation 
is to calculate the risk to any individual who lives within 
a particular distance from a plant; or who follows a particular 
pattern of life that might subject him or her to the consequences 
of an accident. In making such an estimate the first question 
concerns how likely is an accident in the first place, and for this 
it is necessary to consider the likelihood of each important kind 
of plant failure. Data on the reliability (i.e. failure rates) of plant 
and particular components are collected and computerized to assist 
in such studies. Account has to be taken for the reliability 
of human beings in the design, construction, testing, operation, 
maintenance, and modification of such plant and components. 
Then the results of particular failures, e.g. how much toxic gas, 
or flammable substance, or radioactivity would be released, have 
to be considered. It is then necessary to calculate how such 
releases would be likely to affect a hypothetical person who was 
at some particular spot, taking account of the possibility that 
he or she might be in or out of doors; what dose would 
be received, and what harm would this do. Such calculations have 
also to take account of the behaviour of substances under different 
weather conditions. Population and sometimes transport patterns 
have to be considered. Finally, the chances of harm from all 
significant failure causes have to be summed up to give the overall 
level of risk from the installation. Only when such complex 
studies and calculations have been made it is possible to predict 
the chance that any individual living within a particular radius, 
or behaving in a certain way, will be injured by an accident. Such 
calculations are referred to as individual risk calculations, 
and enable us to say things like a person who lives within half 
a mile radius of such and such a plant has a chance of x per annum 
of being injured from an accident at the plant. 
According to the different forms of hazard for which 
calculations are made, there are various possible ways in which 
people might be injured. They might die more or less 
instantaneously from the effects of explosions, fire or toxic gas 
release. Radiation is a different case, since unless the dose 
is extremely large death within a few weeks or even years would 
be extremely unlikely. What could happen is that, depending 
on size of the doses, a proportion of the people receiving them 
would develop a cancer some years after the exposure took place 
or possibly pass on a genetic abnormality to some of their 
descendants (a number of non-radioactive chemicals can cause 
the same sort of effects). So, by and large, the risk that 
an individual experiences from radiation exposure is to increase 
somewhat that person's chance later in life of developing a cancer, 
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which might or might not be treatable. This needs to be borne 
in mind when comparing the effects of exposure to ionising 
radiation with the effects of conventional accidents, which 
are immediate. 
To estimate large events, we use the term societal risk, 
and in doing so, we have to consider not only the many different 
forms an accident could take, but the multiple consequences 
involved and their cost or severity. In principle at least, 
the different forms of harm that could follow from a very large 
accident could be added up and given a money value, provided 
of course that one is prepared to attach a value to the loss 
of human life [18]. 
Then effectiveness of engineered safety systems, their 
reliability as well as adequacy of safety procedures 
and countermeasures availability can be assessed. Moreover, 
the main weaknesses of nuclear systems and the most probable 
sequences of undesired events can be also identified early 
at design and pre-commissioning stage, which gives a chance 
to successfully preventing their occurrence during plant operation. 
It should be noted that some engineering aspects important 
to safety may not be explicitly addressed in the safety analysis. 
For some of these aspects, no well-defined acceptance criteria 
are available and therefore the assessment of the compliance 
with the safety requirements is based on a good engineering 
judgement. 
2. Safety assessment for facilities and activities 
In general ensuring safety of nuclear installations 
and activities is reducing to acceptable level the radiation risk 
for people and environment, they generate during their whole life 
cycle. Comprehensive safety assessment is an indispensable mean 
facilitating to achieve this goal. IAEA set up 24 principles 
for recommended safety assessment including its goal, scope. 
procedures and uses [32]. In particular the principles state 
the following: 
• The responsibility for carrying out the safety assessment shall 
rest with the responsible legal person, i.e. the person 
or the organization responsible for the facility or activity. 
• The primary purposes of the safety assessment shall 
be to determine whether an adequate level of safety has been 
achieved for a facility or activity and whether the basic safety 
objectives and safety criteria established by the designer, 
the operating organization and the regulatory body, 
in compliance with the requirements for radiation protection 
and safety as established in the International Basic Safety 
Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation 
and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, have been fulfilled. 
• The results of the safety assessment shall be used to specify 
the programme for maintenance, surveillance and inspection; 
to specify the procedures to be put in place for all operational 
activities significant to safety and for responding 
to anticipated operational occurrences and accidents; 
to specify the necessary competences for the staff involved 
in the facility or activity and to make decisions 
in an integrated, risk informed approach. 
Figure 1 shows the main elements of the safety assessment 
process. Before proceeding safety assessment, proper setup has 
to be prepared, which includes ensuring the necessary resources 
(e.g. sufficient number of specialists and adequate funding), 
information (e.g. details of design and construction of the facility) 
and analytical tools (e.g. computer codes for carrying 
out the safety analysis). Moreover the safety limits must 
be defined in the national regulations in order to assess 
if the safety of the facility or activity is adequate or not. 
After the preparation process there are several features 
to be assessed including the possible radiation risks associated 
with the facility or activity, all relevant safety functions performed 
to prevent or mitigate the consequences of undesired events, site 
characteristics relating to the safety, available measures in place 
to protect people and the environment from harmful effects 
of the ionizing radiation as well as some engineering aspects (e.g. 
quality of safety related equipment) and possible human errors. 
The safety assessment covers also checking whether the basic 
safety principles, like defence in depth (DID) philosophy, safety 
margins and multiple barriers rule, are efficiently implemented. 
All these aspects will be described in details and discussed in this 
article in the context of the decision making process. 
Another part of the safety assessment are the safety analyses. 
The full range of undesired initiating events, that could occur over 
a broad range of operational states (including different levels 
of availability of the safety systems), is addressed in such studies 
(Tab. 1). In general there are two complementary methods 
to perform them: the deterministic (DSA – Deterministic Safety 
Assessment) and probabilistic one (PSA). The major objectives 
and methodology as well as differences and limitations of this two 
approaches will be analyzed in this paper. However, regardless 
of approach these analyses aim to verify whether facility 
or activity is in compliance with safety criteria, defined 
by the national regulations and the regulatory body requirements. 
 
Fig. 1. Overview of the safety assessment process [cf. 32] 
Table 1. Possible subdivision of postulated initiating events [31] 
Occurrence 
(1/reactor year) Characteristics Plant state Terminology 
10-2 – 1 
 
Expected over the 
lifetime of the plant 
Expected 
Anticipated 
operational 
occurrences 
Anticipated transients, 
transients, frequent 
faults, incidents of 
moderate frequency, 
upset conditions, 
abnormal conditions 
10-4 – 10-2 
 
Chance greater than 
1% over the 
lifetime of the plant 
Possible Design basis accidents 
Infrequent incidents, 
infrequent faults, limiting 
faults, emergency 
conditions 
10-6 – 10-4 
 
Chance less than 
1% over the 
lifetime of the plant 
Unlikely 
Beyond 
design basis 
accidents 
Faulted conditions 
< 10-6 
 
Very unlikely to 
occur 
Remote Severe accidents Faulted conditions 
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The deterministic analyses (DSA) require determination 
of the minimum margins to the acceptance criteria for each group 
of postulated initiating events and sequences. Then an adequate 
set of conservative or best estimate assumptions for the initial 
and boundary conditions should be used. 
This type of safety analysis covers only those combinations 
of transients whose frequency remains the design basis accidents. 
Thus the time span of any considered scenario should extend 
up to the moment when the plant reaches a safe and stable 
end state. 
The PSA studies provide estimations of both probability 
and consequences of an accident scenarios possibly leading 
to the core melt and radiological releases to the environment i.e. 
for beyond design basis accidents and severe accidents. 
Results of these studies should be additionally verified 
by the independent organization in order to ensure that there 
are neither oversights nor mistakes. In general, after verification 
process the results of deterministic studies complemented by some 
PSA results on beyond design basis accidents and severe accidents 
are included into the overall Safety Assessment Report (SAR). 
This report contains also another important conclusions from 
the safety assessment on limits and conditions of the facility 
operating or the carried out activity, maintenance schedule, 
management and emergency preparedness. 
The SAR, when completed, is then submitted to the regulatory 
body, authorized to its acceptance, rejection or to request 
additional revisions. Without acceptance of the SAR any nuclear 
facility cannot operate and nuclear activity can no longer 
be carried out. This is also a condition for successful completion 
of the licensing process of new installations and activities 
to be launched in the future. 
3. An integrated risk informed decision making 
The fundamental objective of nuclear safety assessment 
is to protect people and the environment from the ionizing 
radiation. For that purpose the risks associated with nuclear power 
plants, throughout their life cycle, must be maintained as low 
as reasonably practicable. It means minimizing the radiological 
exposures from normal NPP operation, preventing potential 
nuclear accidents and mitigating the consequences when they 
occur. Moreover, the design weaknesses, can be identified before 
the nuclear power plant construction. It gives a chance to abandon 
technology, which does not meet the specified requirements 
and thereby does not provide appropriate safety level. 
Since there are various factors affecting the safety of nuclear 
power plants, different techniques are used to assess the risks 
associated with them. The traditional approach to safety analysis 
is based on the deterministic principles, that underlies the design 
and operation of the nuclear power plants. Its philosophy 
is to ensure that the design is fault tolerant, to adequately meet 
a defence in depth rules, to emphasize safety acceptance criteria 
and to maintain adequate safety margins even during a postulated 
system failures. Finally, the objective of deterministic safety 
studies is to demonstrate that the designed barriers will prevent 
an uncontrolled release of radioactive materials to the environment 
for all plant states assuming the conservative approach [31]. 
Nevertheless, there are also safety issues requiring both 
the deterministic and probabilistic assessment. As an example, 
equipment qualification of nuclear power plant components 
can be discussed. It must be demonstrated, basing on deterministic 
approach, that the performance of equipment required to survive 
design basis accidents, is adequate [31]. In order to be sure that 
the systems and components crucial for nuclear safety will 
perform their function properly, according to the design both 
under normal operational conditions as well as during an accident, 
it is necessary to check their resistance to the accident conditions 
[14]. This activity is one of the defence in depth methods 
for protection against the release of radioactive materials 
and preventing failures of equipment due to hazardous service 
conditions, e.g. high temperature, humidity and radiation fields 
or high vibration due to earthquake. Moreover, the time 
of exposure and the ageing process of equipment should be also 
taken into account in that kind of analysis [20]. 
However, while the deterministic analysis answers question 
if the safety margins are retained during a postulated accident, 
the probabilistic approach is able to predict the occurrence 
frequency of such an accident. Therefore, the probabilistic 
assessment of equipment failure frequency has been recognised 
as an important factor of the qualification process next 
to the deterministic study. Furthermore, the priorities 
for equipment qualification may be dictated by the predicted 
consequences of specific component failures and their impact 
on overall nuclear safety. These factors could be assessed 
by probabilistic methods to identify the increase of public risk 
as a result of the postulated failures [20]. 
Nowadays, there is a general consensus that the Probabilistic 
Safety Assessment has reached the status of methodology mature 
enough to strongly influence the design and operation of nuclear 
power plants. It is being used to complement the deterministic 
approach and to provide additional insights that would 
not otherwise be available. Therefore, it is believed that its usage 
by regulatory bodies in the risk informed regulation concept 
can result in reduced threat for the public health [29]. Thus 
the international standards indicate that the results of the safety 
assessment have to be used in order to make decisions 
in an integrated, risk informed approach, by means of which 
the results from the deterministic studies, probabilistic insights 
and any other requirements are combined in making decisions 
on safety matters in relation to the nuclear facility or activity [32]. 
An integrated risk informed decision making process (IRIDM), 
if performed in balanced and comprehensive manner, should bring 
transparency and auditability to complex decisions. However, 
its applicability depends strongly on appropriate integration 
of a number of differently weighted elements [36]. 
The IRIDM process has been originally defined as a modern, 
systematic approach to identification and balanced integration 
of the major contributors influencing nuclear power plant safety 
[36]. However, the universality of its methodology makes 
it applicable to all types of nuclear facilities and activities that 
give rise to radiation risks, including research reactors, nuclear 
installations as well as the use of radiation and radioactive 
sources, the transport of radioactive material and the management 
of radioactive waste. Additionally, the IRIDM process has been 
recognised as a flexible tool, which after appropriate adjustments, 
can be successfully applied to the non-nuclear technological 
installations [3]. 
The main concept of the IRIDM process has been developed 
in order to support utilities and regulatory bodies in both making 
right decisions on safety issues for nuclear facilities as well 
as prioritising their own tasks, according to the significance of risk 
associated with different fields of their activity. 
In case of plant operators there is an additional reason of their 
interest to the IRIDM methodology implementation 
in the management process, economical optimisation of their 
activity. However, the transparency of this approach to decision 
making and the explicit consideration of risk, makes the IRIDM 
process useful for the international nuclear community as a whole, 
including designers, suppliers, licensees, operators and technical 
support organizations. 
Usually, when an unique, non-routine decision on safety 
matters in relation to the nuclear facility or activity has 
to be made, qualitatively different insights must be taken into 
account together, including deterministic and probabilistic 
outcomes, regulatory requirements, economic, social and other 
safety important factors. Additionally, application of these 
approach to physical security is now being considered 
by the international community. 
Finally, one can define the IRIDM process as a comprehensive 
way of making decisions about modifications of the design 
or procedures, which are related to safety of nuclear facilities 
and activities, as well as changes in the security systems in order 
to reduce the impact of a terrorist threat. Safety and security 
issues, when considered together in an integrated manner, should 
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lead to coherent solutions, which means that enhancements made 
in these areas cannot adversely affect, but assist each other. 
Moreover, the integrated approach to the decision making 
process seems to be especially useful in such cases, when there 
is a number of different options leading to acceptable results. Then 
the risk informed analysis of multi attribute safety, security 
and regulatory issues is powerful enough to identify the expected 
optimum solution. 
4. Basic framework and key elements of IRIDM 
Since the general idea as well as the main objectives 
of the risk informed approach to decision making seem to be clear 
and reasonable, the formal framework of this process is needed 
to identify and describe in details the interrelations between its key 
elements. The implementation of a commonly known scheme 
of the decision making allows to review the fact-based grounds 
of once made decision and, if required, its reconsideration. 
4.1. Characterization of the issue 
According to the basic framework, describing the IRIDM 
process (Fig. 2), the clear and unambiguous definition of issue 
to be resolved is crucial to identify which elements or information 
are relevant to making a decision. The issue characterization 
should provide additionally its necessity evidence as well as 
an impact on the facility operation and safety, which covers 
required design changes, security arrangements, organizational 
model, internal procedures, man-machine interactions and other 
factors, that potentially might be dependent on the decision related 
to the considered matter. 
 
Fig. 2. Organizational framework and key elements of the IRIDM process [cf. 36] 
4.2. List of options to choose from 
After defining the problem, consideration must be given 
to the requirements of both regulatory body and licensee in order 
to draft a preliminary set of options, that potentially could solve 
the issue. However, to make the final decision and choose 
one from the preliminary set of options, specified inputs must 
be established, namely the standards and good practices, operating 
experience, deterministic and probabilistic considerations, 
organizational and security systems and other factors such 
as research or economic insights. Relative importance of each 
element depends upon the decision to be made and should 
be weighted either qualitatively or quantitatively. This process 
leads to evaluation and to reduction of the preliminary set 
of options. Finally one of them should be chosen, implemented 
and monitored. If the performance of just implemented decision 
is not satisfactory corrective actions should be undertaken 
and the list of options needs to be redefined. 
4.3. Standards and good practices 
The basic principle of decision making is the compliance with 
legal requirements in any case under consideration. Thus the 
national legislation, including the regulatory requirements, must 
be strictly respected. Besides of mandatory regulations there 
are also generally accepted international standards and procedures, 
developed by professional bodies like government agencies 
or engineering organizations. These standards are usually based 
on the long operating experience and practical implementations 
of IRIDM. In such a way best practices are described 
and published in the form of official guidance and their 
considerations has been recognized as a major factor in many 
IRIDM activities. 
4.4. Operating experience 
The operating experience is also important in the context 
of the consequences prediction. Lessons learned from 
the undesired events that have occurred at the nuclear power plant 
itself or at the similar facilities provide the information what can 
happen and how to prevent it. This knowledge is applicable 
in all other IRIDM inputs assessment, including both deterministic 
and probabilistic insights as well as the organizational, security, 
research and economic considerations [23, 26]. 
4.5. Deterministic considerations 
The deterministic principles, that underlie the safety design 
and operation of nuclear facilities, require firstly the definition 
of safety criteria to be meet, secondly the appropriate level 
of defence in depth to be guaranteed and finally large safety 
margins to be ensured. The safety criteria mean a set of values, 
describing crucial parameters and performance of the nuclear 
installations, in compliance with which its safety is justified e.g. 
maximum acceptable peak cladding temperature of the fuel rods. 
These requirements cover also the limits of the radiological doses 
for the operating staff and for the public as a whole, which cannot 
be exceeded. In order to determine whether the predefined IRIDM 
options meet all deterministic acceptance criteria, established 
by the regulatory documentation, the design basis accident (DBA) 
analysis must be performed [21, 36, 37]. 
The DBA analysis starts from postulating a set of initiating 
events, which – if occur – could potentially lead to a nuclear 
accident. Then the different accident scenarios are verified 
in the context of the design capability for protecting against such 
events within the limits specified by acceptance criteria. 
The scenarios depend on the performance of safety systems 
designed to mitigate the consequences of undesired events 
and to prevent the accident in any case. Therefore additionally, 
single or multiple failures of these systems are postulated during 
the DBA analysis. Moreover, the conservative assumptions 
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are made in such a study in order to demonstrate that the relevant 
safety functions can be provided despite the postulated failures 
even in the worst case [37]. To meet such strict requirements 
it is necessary to maintain appropriate safety margins 
and to implement the fundamental rules of the defence in depth 
(DID) methodology. 
The DID approach to the design and operation of nuclear 
power plants aims to ensure that there are multiple safety systems 
and barriers, designed to prevent core damage, containment failure 
and consequently release of radioactive material outside the plant. 
Therefore, the redundancy of safety systems must be guaranteed, 
which means their physical separation and diversity. In other 
words, almost each safety system is able to play more than 
one role, depending on time and type of an accident, which means 
it can be used to perform different functions while different 
accident scenarios. It implies that one safety function, crucial 
to prevent the consequences of undesired event, can also 
be performed by a few separated technical installations using 
different equipment, which ensures the alternative way to the 
accident counteraction. It is also a good practice to use different 
physical processes in the alternative systems intended to perform 
concrete safety function, e.g. reactor shutdown can be achieved 
by both dropping control rods into the core and injecting boron 
into the primary coolant system. In such a case the function 
of a mechanical system can be taken over by the chemical one. 
Another issue is the independence of safety systems, which 
is crucial to avoid the common cause failure of a few installations 
at the same time. In particular, it is important to provide redundant 
electrical power supply for each safety system, meaning 
that at least two separated external sources are needed. However, 
the active systems are to support the five physical barriers between 
the radioactive material and the environment, namely: fuel 
material, fuel cladding, boundary of primary loop (including 
reactor pressure vessel), containment and reactor building [27, 
28]. Any change of the NPP configuration that could bring some 
benefits, but also may lead to loss any of DID barriers 
is not acceptable according to IRIDM. 
Safety margins describe the difference between the limiting 
values of assigned parameters and their actual values. Since 
the limiting values must not be exceeded, because it would lead 
to failure of important structures, systems or components (SSCs), 
existence of appropriate margins assures safety of nuclear power 
plants in all modes of operation. The highest priority is given 
to those safety margins, that are related to physical barriers 
protecting against the release of radioactive material. This safety 
margins are commonly expressed as a maximum fuel temperature, 
peak clad temperature, its oxidation level, reactor coolant 
pressure, stress and material condition, reactor containment 
pressure and temperature, radiological doses to the staff 
and the public. However, the precise determination of safety 
margins for these parameters is often very hard to obtain or even 
impossible. It is because, in many cases, both the limiting values 
of the relevant parameters and their actual values are provided 
by the calculations with usage of complex computer codes. 
Since the computer simulations provide the results with 
uncertainties and not the exact real values, there are two options 
to assess the appropriate level of safety margins. First one is based 
on conservatism in calculations, which means pessimistic 
approach during the whole process (Fig. 3). This approach 
is assumed to determine the safety margins much lower than they 
actually are, which is not optimal from the economic point 
of view, because it needs some additional resources to balance 
the very pessimistic assumptions [25]. Therefore the second 
solution, leading to the best estimation of safety margins, is more 
and more commonly applied. This approach, based on realistic 
assumptions instead of the pessimistic ones, is additionally 
supplemented by the uncertainty analysis. As a result the actual 
value of a particular parameter is estimated by the calculated 
one including the upper bound of its uncertainty. 
 
Fig. 3. Different approaches to the assessment of safety margins [cf. 25] 
In both the pessimistic and best estimate approach to safety 
margins, the criteria established by the regulatory body are usually 
more restrictive than the actual limiting values, which makes 
the overall assessment more conservative. Regardless 
of the approach to assessing the safety margins, every time 
when IRIDM decision leads to its reduction it must be subjected 
to a detailed examination. 
4.6. Probabilistic considerations 
Probabilistic analysis is intended to complement deterministic 
approach by identification of all contributions to the risk 
in an integrated model that otherwise may be overlooked. 
The outcomes from these considerations include both quantitative 
and qualitative insights to the IRIDM process. 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is an essential element 
of IRIDM because it provides relevant information on all possible 
initiating events, internal hazards (including fires and floods), 
external hazards (including seismic events), system failures 
and human errors, that would potentially lead to a nuclear 
accident. Afterwards various sequences of the accident progress 
can be identified depending on the success or failure of safety 
systems required to mitigate the consequences of undesired, 
but predicted events. These sequences are then depicted in a form 
of an event tree (Fig. 4). 
 
Fig. 4. Simplified diagram of PSA Level-1 – event tree and fault tree construction 
Since the reliability of particular safety systems can 
be obtained based on probabilities of basic equipment failures 
and human errors, the identified accident sequences can 
be evaluated quantitatively as well. In order to quantify the event 
tree, it is necessary to develop a fault tree for each relevant safety 
system, by identification of basic events, i.e. equipment failures 
and human errors, and their relations. Moreover, the frequency 
of each basic event has to be assessed based on operational 
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experience or external database. It makes this approach capable 
of calculating the frequency of each accident sequence, 
and especially those leading to the reactor core damage. 
The methodology described above is related to PSA Level-1 
and aims to calculate the core damage frequency (CDF) [33]. PSA 
Level-2 models phenomena that could occur following the core 
damage, challenges to the containment integrity and transport 
of radioactive material in the containment. At this stage potential 
ways for the radioactive releases from the nuclear facility to the 
environment are investigated. As a result large release frequency 
(LRF) can be estimated in the same way as those for the core 
damage frequency [34]. Level-3 PSA models the consequences 
of such releases in order to estimate the risks to the public health 
and societal risks like the contamination of land or food. 
Thus the adverse consequences of postulated undesired events 
may be described as a function of various factors like equipment 
failures, human errors or weather conditions. Since these factors 
are statistical, the technical design features and internal procedures 
must minimize the risk. It implies that the IRIDM decision 
on changing installation design or operational procedures should 
not significantly increase neither the CDF nor LRF. Often instead 
of frequencies, which describe the expected number 
of occurrences per year, dimensionless probabilities or conditional 
probabilities are used to present the PSA results. 
Besides of quantitative PSA outcomes, i.e. CDF and LRF, 
there are also qualitatively important insights. It was recognized, 
that the PSA logic model itself, even without of the reliability 
data, is an important source of relevant information on safety 
issues. The main advantage of this methodology 
is the comprehensive approach to all facility systems, which 
allows to conduct analysis of the interrelations between very basic 
components and their impact on overall safety. 
First of all, the relative impact of IRIDM decision 
on the facility can be observed by simple modification of the PSA 
model with accordance to the considered IRIDM option. 
Comparing PSA models for both cases, before and after 
modification postulated by IRIDM, it is often possible to state 
if the changes are qualitatively positive or negative, when it comes 
to the safety. For example if the proposed changes lead to reduce 
redundancy level of electric power supply the core damage 
frequency will certainly increase significantly. Additionally, based 
on the PSA logic model it is possible to indicate these systems, 
availability of which would be especially affected by the proposed 
changes. It is also possible to check how many different events 
could be potentially caused by each single failure or human error. 
On the other hand so-called minimal cut sets (MCSs) 
can be specified as the minimal combinations of component’s 
failures and human errors leading to undesired state of particular 
safety systems or the installation as a whole. The MCSs review 
of the probabilistic model allows to identify if there 
is a compliance with the single failure criterion, which is one 
of the fundamental design principles and aims to ensure that there 
are no single events leading directly to the whole system 
unavailability. 
4.7. Organizational considerations 
Organizational issues are increasingly important and need 
to be considered when making a decision within the IRIDM 
process next to the safety analyses. Typical inputs from these 
considerations include information related to the management 
systems under both normal and emergency operating conditions. 
In order to enhance safety the management process should cover 
a wide range of aspects including competence development 
by appropriate trainings for staff, systematic inspection 
of equipment maintenance and tests, taking care of good 
communication and cooperation between staff as well as 
refinement of internal procedures and many other organizational 
actions [36]. 
However, from the IRIDM point of view, it is important 
to identify how does the proposed option might affect an existing 
organizational system and how many efforts needs to be made 
in order to implement and monitor the decision. Finally, even 
if there is a formal readiness to many organizational changes, like 
e.g. employment increasing, specialized trainings for new staff, 
equipment modernization and development of additional 
procedures, the main question is if there is enough time 
and financial resources to achieve the goals. If the answer is not, 
the IRIDM option will be rejected, irrespective of good results 
from the preliminary safety studies. 
4.8. Security considerations 
Physical protection of the nuclear facility and the nuclear 
material on the site is crucial to reduce the potential threat 
of terrorist acts. However, since some interfaces between safety 
and security issues exist their proper integration in the IRIDM 
process is required. Therefore it is especially important to consider 
all security challenges related to the proposed IRIDM option in the 
context of their safety impact. Moreover, the security issues may 
be associated with new investments and structural changes, which 
should be also taken into account during the IRIDM process [35]. 
4.9. Other considerations 
Although the IRIDM process has been assumed and developed 
as a set of concrete issues to be considered every time when non-
routine decision needs to be made, its framework is not 
completely fixed nor limited to only those aspects, which were 
described above. There are also other special considerations, 
relevant for each particular problem, which need to be identified 
and included into the IRIDM framework. These additional factors 
could be related to workers irradiation risks during hardware 
modifications, economic costs and benefits of the postulated 
changes or the new results of scientific research. 
The radiation doses, that would be received by the workers 
involved in the facility modification process, would need 
to be estimated for each of the options evaluated during 
the IRIDM considerations. Then the estimation results should 
be compared with the doses from normal operation 
and the difference would need to be calculated and included into 
the IRIDM process as an important factor. Consequently, the final 
IRIDM decision should ensure the minimization of the additional 
doses. 
It is also a generally known statement that the safety measures 
have their economic effects, costs and benefits, that should 
be balanced. Although in general the safety issues are the priority 
and the acceptance criteria must be met in any case, some 
additional improvements may be blocked by insufficient financial 
resources. Resignation of heavy investments may be justified 
especially when there is a short remaining lifetime of the facility. 
5. Uncertainty assessment in the IRIDM process 
There is a general international agreement, that both 
the deterministic and probabilistic approaches, when considered 
together in a complementary manner, form a mature enough 
and comprehensive methodology of safety assessment. However 
their limitations should be also indicated. 
In general there are two major types of the PSA uncertainties: 
aleatory (i.e. the inherent variability of the measurable physical 
quantities) and epistemic ones (coming from lack of complete 
knowledge about systems, processes and modelled phenomena). 
While the first type is irreducible, the second one (including 
parameter uncertainty, model uncertainty and completeness 
uncertainty) may be reduced over time by additional measures, 
testing and analyses. In this paper both aleatory and epistemic 
PSA uncertainties are discussed in the context of the decision 
making process. 
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The uncertainty analysis is also associated with deterministic 
studies and includes model simplifications, input data 
uncertainties and computational accuracy. Moreover there 
are some limitations related to availability of adequate hardware 
resources. All these aspects of the DSA uncertainties are discussed 
below in more detail. 
5.1. Uncertainties of deterministic considerations 
The deterministic studies, based on computer simulations, 
are very complex and need multidisciplinary knowledge 
and experience. First of all, the virtual 2D or even 3D model 
corresponding to the real system has to be developed. Then the 
whole volume occupied by the model is divided into discrete cells 
forming the volume mesh or nodalization. However, due to high 
complexity of such a geometry some general assumptions have  
to be made. The simplification of the system geometry implies the 
reduction of results accuracy at the very beginning of the analysis. 
Another uncertainties come from input data. Usually the one 
who performs the simulation is not the one who do the 
measurements during the experiment. Lack of the measurement 
background information will certainly lead to make some 
assumptions when simulation setup is prepared. From time  
to time, some of the parameters necessary to put into the code are 
simply impossible to measure. This means, certain assumptions, 
generally conservative, have to be taken into account again.  
The problem is that every assumption (especially conservative 
one) introduces undesired uncertainty. Hence, the safety margin 
become blur and inexact. Also, in most of the cases the 
experiment is designed to prove existence of appropriate safety 
margins in real-life reliable conditions and not necessarily  
to support the DSA simulation which creates another space 
for speculations. 
When the setup is ready to run, another source of uncertainties 
in deterministic analysis appears. This is a numerical calculation 
which always give an approximate, but never the accurate 
solution. Thus the physical phenomena, simulated in order 
to check if the safety margins are retained during the postulated 
accident, cannot be accurately described. The quality of results 
may depend on software, i.e. finite computational accuracy, 
introduction of empirical models, which not always fits the range 
of application, inaccurate implementation of methods from 
handbooks etc. may and surly will affect final results. 
Finally, there is also an user effect issue that should 
be outlined. It is a quite common situation when two or more 
analysts are performing the same simulation, basing on the same 
input data, using the same software, but achieving different 
results. This is due to their experience, routine, perceptivity 
and so on. 
Moreover, the more complex geometry needs to be mapped 
in details, the lower scale of mesh elements is required, which 
leads to increase of the computational domain. It is because 
the appropriate calculations are performed for each element 
in the volume mesh of a higher density. It provides the higher 
resolution of the results, but also the high performance computing 
is needed, which implies additional limitations related 
to computation time and availability of hardware resources. 
5.2. Uncertainties of probabilistic considerations 
The uncertainty analysis is even more integrated with 
the probabilistic approach. It is because its methodology is used 
in modelling of processes and phenomena, that can be described 
only statistically. Consequently, the initiating events, system 
failures and human errors, considered by the PSA studies, have 
a random nature and appropriate frequencies or probabilities 
of their occurrence have to be assessed. 
Besides of the quantitative assessment, the PSA analysis itself 
bases on the development of event trees and fault trees linking 
the events through the logical gates (Fig. 4). Thus the uncertainties 
corresponding to the particular basic events can propagate 
in the whole logical structure influencing the top events 
probabilities. Consequently, both these elements, development 
of the PSA logic models and assessment of basic events 
frequencies, introduce some uncertainties, which could have 
a significant impact on the final PSA results [40]. 
Since the PSA uncertainties have different sources, there 
are also different types of them, aleatory and epistemic, which 
should be analysed separately. The first one is associated with 
the inherent variability of measurable physical quantities, which 
implies the random nature of the initiating events and component 
failures. Thus the aleatory uncertainties cannot be reduced neither 
by further studies nor even by enlarging of the data set, but they 
can be assessed based on the traditional data analysis. 
Database enlarging can, however, improve the representation 
of the probability distribution of those stochastic variables, like 
time to failure or time to repair, for all components of the system. 
Then the Monte Carlo method can be used in order to assess 
the aleatory uncertainty as well as the mean value and variance 
of the top event probability. It can be accomplished by sampling 
of the probability density functions of stochastic variables 
corresponding to the particular failures [10]. 
The epistemic uncertainties arise when making statistical 
inferences from the data, due to a lack of complete knowledge 
about systems, processes and modelled phenomena. In contrast 
to the aleatory uncertainties, the epistemic ones may be reduced 
over time, by additional measures, testing and analyses, leading 
to increase the data set and the knowledge. There are three types 
of epistemic uncertainties in PSA: parameter uncertainty, model 
uncertainty and completeness uncertainty. The identification, 
understanding and consideration of these types of uncertainties 
is crucial for the comprehensiveness of PSA study 
and consequently for the IRIDM process [16]. 
Parameter uncertainties relate to the computation of the input 
parameter values, used to quantify probabilities of the events 
in the PSA logic model, given that the mathematical form 
of the model itself has been agreed to be appropriate.  
It is a common practice to characterize these parameters by using 
probability distributions instead of their point values. Thus 
the treatment of both aleatory and parameter uncertainties, 
requires a two-loops Monte Carlo simulation. The outer loop 
samples the epistemic variables, when the inner loop is to aleatory 
ones [8, 13]. In addition, the epistemic correlations, when 
the same parameter is used to quantify the probabilities of two 
or more basic events, should be considered. Otherwise, 
if the correlation between the events is neglected, the uncertainty 
of system failure probability would be underestimated [40]. 
Model uncertainties are related to such cases, for which 
no consensus approach or model exists. Thus, if the chosen model 
is not suitable to represent a particular aspect of the plant, 
the uncertainty of PSA results would also exist. It comes from 
a lack of knowledge of how the SSCs can behave under 
the conditions arising from an accident. It is because some 
of the phenomena being modelled are not completely understood 
yet. Moreover, for some of them, the existed data or other 
information were collected under different conditions than those 
expected during the postulated accident. Therefore the model 
uncertainties assessment usually needs the expert judgment [4]. 
Another issue is the completeness uncertainty. It represents 
those aspects that are, either knowingly or unknowingly, 
not addressed in the model. The omission of some aspects 
can result from the lack of suitable methodology for the analysis 
of them. The resources to develop a complete model may be also 
limited, which implies simplifications. 
6. The general concept of the integration process 
The main challenge of the IRIDM process is to indicate  
the best option solving the specified issue in a logical, structured, 
and comprehensive manner. This approach leads to transparency 
of the decision making process and allows to understand why and 
how the decision was reached, which factors were taken into 
account and what was their relative importance. The decision 
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made in that way, when documented sufficiently, is reproducible 
and can be verified by independent group of specialists [36]. 
In order to achieve an optimal and unbiased solution 
of the postulated issue, the appropriate integration of different 
IRIDM elements is needed. First of all, it must be demonstrated 
that the essential requirements are satisfied for each element 
separately. For that purpose an implementation of some additional 
safety measures could be required, but these improvements must 
not affect adversely the other IRIDM inputs. 
However, since all key elements of IRIDM are somehow 
depended on each other, the integration process should 
be an iterative one and consideration should be given to all inputs 
again after one of them has been changed. If the proposed 
improvements leading to meet one of the safety factors adversely 
affect at least one another, one needs to consider 
an implementation of alternative safety measures to ensure 
the acceptability of all relevant factors. 
Figure 5 depicts the combination of the deterministic 
and probabilistic elements, which is a part of the overall IRIDM 
integration process. The deterministic considerations answer 
question if the safety systems are able to meet their design intent 
properly and if the other requirements like defence in depth 
or safety margins are ensured. The PSA instead investigates 
all possible sources of equipment failures, human errors, internal 
and external hazards, which could lead to unavailability of safety 
systems or breach of the safety barriers. 
There are also some interfaces between these two elements. 
It is enough to mention that deterministic calculations are used 
to specified the success criteria for each safety system, that 
are required as an input to the PSA analysis. These success criteria 
mean the minimum conditions, under which the designed safety 
system is recognized to be sufficient to perform its functions 
properly, even if there are some failures of its single components. 
Basing on that criteria, the total system unavailability or severely 
limitation of its functionality can be defined, which is crucial 
for system reliability assessment under accident conditions. 
 
Fig. 5. Integration of deterministic approach and probabilistic insights [cf. 36] 
On the other hand, the probabilistic considerations are able 
to indicate additional initiating events, which should be included 
into the deterministic studies. Moreover, the PSA methodology 
is used in prioritising of the events in order to focus more 
intensively on those cases that are more probable. It is also 
applicable to define assumptions for the so-called risk informed 
best estimate deterministic calculations, which are more and more 
commonly applied instead of conservative ones. The deterministic 
results are then compared with appropriate acceptance criteria 
given by the regulatory body, while the PSA insights are assessed 
in the context of risk minimization. Only when the requirements 
of both are satisfied the IRIDM option can be implemented. 
Nevertheless, the major challenge of the integration process 
is to assess the relative importance of various qualitative 
and quantitative inputs in the single IRIDM implementation, 
as it will be described later in this paper. 
7. IRIDM implementation and workflow process 
The general framework of the IRIDM process, described 
in this paper, can be applied to decision making  
by all stakeholders involved in the nuclear industry,  
i.e. the regulatory bodies, NPP operators and technology vendors. 
However, some necessary prerequisites have to be met before 
implementing the IRIDM approach to consider a certain issue. 
7.1. Preparation for performing IRIDM 
Prerequisites of the IRIDM implementation may be developed 
as a consensus between the stakeholders (Fig. 6). Through 
the cooperation of the regulatory body, NPP operator and TSO, 
the risk informed safety policy needs to be established 
at the national level. While the ultimate responsibility 
for the policy lies as usually in the competence of the regulatory 
body, the cooperation between stakeholders has been recognized 
as an important aspect of the preparation process for the IRIDM 
performance.  
The safety policy, prepared in that way, should cover the high 
level safety goals and acceptance criteria to be applicable  
in the future implementations of IRIDM [11]. It may also indicate 
possible ways to exempt from the specified regulatory 
requirements or even to changing them in very special cases,  
if these requirements are against the justified proposals  
or conclusions of IRIDM. 
Once the national policy is approved the decision to apply 
IRIDM approach in the future activity of the stockholders can be 
taken. However the potential limitations of the IRIDM process  
in the specific organization has to be analyzed. 
The major factors influencing the implementation  
of the IRIDM methods within the specified organizational 
structure are the following: relevant infrastructure, competence 
base and computational codes. Therefore the existing 
organizational structure, employees competencies, computational 
resources as well as the management system itself should be 
adjusted to carrying out the formal IRIDM process regularly 
before its first implementation. 
Since the organizational changes, mentioned above, may cause 
many complex issues, the detailed IRIDM implementation 
programme needs to be developed within the organization in order 
to resolve them all in the structured manner. The programme  
for the IRIDM implementation should indicate the potential fields 
of its applicability first. It means that the range of issues should  
be defined by the regulatory body and shared between 
stakeholders. Then one needs to provide and develop the whole 
infrastructure suitable to perform and review the analyses covering 
the specified IRIDM inputs. This infrastructure then should  
be capable to understand the conclusions from that process.  
It requires the identification of the expertise areas to be covered 
and the assessment tools to be provided. 
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Fig. 6. Initial preparations for the IRIDM process implementation [cf. 11] 
Another important issue is the division of responsibilities 
regarding IRIDM between individuals within the organization. 
It is a common practice in the industries, where various risks 
for the public exist, to train a group of leaders responsible 
for different types of them. Moreover, there are also specialists 
for financial risk assessment, responsible for minimization 
of the financial losses or bankruptcy probability. Thus, the risks 
associated with the industry should be interpreted not only 
in terms of the potential hazards, which poses some threats 
to the environment or to the public, but also in the context 
of decrease in production efficiency or financial losses, leading 
to the suspension or even cessation of the activity. This 
is the reason why the risk informed decision making process 
in the industry as a whole should be an integrated one. 
The same approach is applicable in the nuclear industry 
through the explicit IRIDM implementation. First, the special 
IRIDM team needs to be established within the organization. 
Since the IRIDM process covers a wide range of issues, 
from technical, through economic up to the psychological ones, 
it is essential for the team to be multidisciplinary, which means 
its members should be specialists in their fields. Then the leaders, 
responsible for different IRIDM inputs, corresponding to various 
risks, should be selected from the team members. The leaders, 
however, are expected to be interdisciplinary, which means 
capable to understand and evaluate the significance of conclusions 
coming from different inputs, in the light of that type of risk, 
which has been assigned to them. 
To fulfil its mission, the team needs to be intensively trained 
for implementing the IRIDM methodology into the real problems. 
However, while the understanding of the IRIDM principles 
is relatively simple, their practical application is usually very 
difficult. Therefore, besides of the general IRIDM training 
for the team as a whole, some specialised courses on various fields 
are necessary to be provided systematically for each group, 
according to its activity area within the team. 
Moreover, the knowledge gained from the trainings and from 
experience as well should be documented in a form of guidelines 
describing the best practices for the IRIDM implementation. 
On that basis some internal procedures and tools can be developed 
for the teamwork improvement. After that it is recommended 
to carry out the pilot project in order to test the IRIDM 
methodology, review the team capability and verify the guidance 
and procedures in a realistic, but small scale preliminary study. 
7.2. Implementation of the IRIDM process 
Practical application of the IRIDM process requires a number 
of systematic steps and activities to be performed in a logical 
order according to the overall workflow (Fig. 7). 
The first stage, covering characterisation of the issue, drafting 
the initial set of options and formation of the IRIDM team, 
has been described above. However, it should be mentioned here, 
that for specific issues the permanent IRIDM team may 
be expanded by additional, even external, experts in order 
to provide required technical support or specialized consultations. 
The second step of the IRIDM workflow is the analysis of its 
feasibility for the specified problem to be solved. It aims 
to identify all potential obstacles associated with the specific issue 
under consideration. It includes the complexity of the problem, 
period of the time required for IRIDM performance in the context 
of deadlines and terms imposed by the regulatory body, as well as 
the availability of financial resources for the comprehensive 
studies. Thus the IRIDM implementation may be abandoned 
because of lack of specialists, lack or incompleteness 
of information regarding the IRIDM inputs, high uncertainties 
of the analysis methods applied in specified area or lack 
of appropriate software tools. In such a case one needs to try 
another method to solve the issue, the less expensive or less time-
consuming one, keeping in mind that it also means less 
comprehensive than the IRIDM is. 
However the answer to the question, if the IRIDM process 
is feasible for the specific issue, is not always simple yes or not. 
Usually, only some options selected from the initial set 
of solutions to be considered are rejected at this stage, while the 
others can be analyzed in the next stages of IRIDM. 
After the decision has been made to implement the formal 
IRIDM approach into the specific issue, one needs to start initial 
preparations for the assessment of the identified inputs required 
by the decision making process. It is important to ensure 
the following things: completeness of detailed technical 
information, sufficient quality of the data with specified 
uncertainties as well as appropriate validation of analytical tools 
and models used in the IRIDM process. All inputs should 
be evaluated for all decision options to check whether 
the proposed solutions meet the existing acceptance criteria. 
Furthermore, it is a good practice to provide an independent 
review of once made analysis in order to verify the results 
credibility. 
The next stage of the IRIDM implementation is the integration 
process. It aims to determine the weights to be attributed to each 
of the inputs in the IRIDM process. However, the weighting scale 
for the inputs needs to be established first. The weighting scale 
describes the range of values for weighting factors assigned 
for particular types of risk. In practise there are two general ways 
for the factors assessment. Qualitative or quantitative approach 
can be applied to achieve it. The first one is to divide the inputs 
into three categories according to their significance 
for the considered issue: high, medium and low. The alternative 
way is to assign them the numerical values from 0 – negligible 
impact, up to 10 – the highest impact on the decision. During the 
weighting process one needs to remember that the factors 
are to specify the relative importance of each input in relation 
to the others [11]. Moreover the weights assigning is quite 
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subjective, based on the engineering judgment and dependent 
on the particular issue being addressed. Therefore various 
techniques have been developed in order to improve this process 
so that it can be carried out in a clear, understandable 
and reasonable manner [1, 7, 17]. 
 
Fig. 7. The overall workflow of activities in the IRIDM process [cf. 37] 
As a result of the weighting process the inputs can be ranked 
by their relative significance for the considered issue. Then 
one can determine the impact of the various IRIDM options 
on the particular inputs. Usually at the beginning the qualitative 
impact assessment is performed. It means each option needs 
to be analyzed in the context whether it has a positive or negative 
impact on each particular input. After that the score 
can be assigned for each option in the range of values from -10 
(the highest negative impact) through 0 (no impact) up to 10 
(the highest positive impact). It allows to evaluate the option i 
by the total weighted score (Si) described by the equation below: 
 ,∑ ⋅=
j
ijji swS  (3) 
where wj is the weighting factor of the input j and sij is the impact 
of option i on the input j based on the scoring approach. 
Consequently, all initially proposed options can be ranked by that 
factor and the best solution can be selected. The recommendation 
is given for that option which has the highest positive impact or, 
if all are negative, the lowest one. 
Having selected an option, final documentation of the IRIDM 
process and its results should be prepared. This documentation 
is essential for the IRIDM implementation while making 
it traceable and reproducible. On this basis, formal application 
for approval of the selected solution can be addressed 
to the regulatory body, which has the necessary authority 
to its acceptance, rejection or to request additional revisions. 
Since IRIDM is an iterative process, the implementation 
of the decision should be reviewed and its performance needs 
to be monitored. If the real implementation is found to be different 
than described in the documentation, the potential reasons should 
be analyzed. In such a case one needs to go back 
into the feasibility stage. On the other hand, if the performance 
of well-implemented option is not satisfactory, the other 
one should be considered. 
7.3. Risk informed regulation 
Although the IRIDM approach has been developed 
to be applied in making decisions on safety issues of nuclear 
facilities, it may be also useful to specify the way in which 
a regulatory body should carry out its activities. 
As an example the risk informed process of the national 
regulations improvement can be considered with accordance 
to the diagram depicted in the figure 8. First, the existing 
regulations should be reviewed in the terms of possible changes 
potentially leading to the safety improvement. As a result the list 
of requirements, that are candidates to be modified, 
can be developed. From that list those elements, for which the risk 
informed approach is suitable, should be identified and prioritized 
according to a number of factors including the risk information. 
It means the regulatory body can weight these factors and make 
a judgment on priorities of the proposed changes based on their 
impact for safety as well as time and resources needed for their 
full implementation. Different options for modification 
of particular requirement can be also considered and scored. 
 
Fig. 8. Risk informed process of improvement the national regulations [cf. 29] 
The last step aims to verify whether the approved modification 
of specific requirement is not in contrary to the other regulations. 
Since this is the iterative process one can back to the previous 
steps and select another regulations to be checked for possible 
improvements. 
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8. Conclusions 
Making a complex decision should always be a structured 
process, not just an act, especially when it comes to the public 
safety. In the nuclear industry an integrated approach to the risk 
informed decision making (IRIDM) is being promoted by such 
organizations as the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. 
NRC). 
In this article the fundamentals of the IRIDM process have 
been thoroughly described based on both the IAEA documentation 
and the U.S. NRC reports. Major benefits of complementary 
approach to the deterministic and probabilistic considerations have 
been specified here as well. 
First of all, the PSA analysis is possible to determine whether 
any group of initiating events makes a contribution to the risk that 
is much higher than the others. It implicates greater levels 
of redundancy and diversity of that equipment, which is intended 
to prevent the most probable events. 
Comprehensiveness of PSA is another advantage of such kind 
of studies. Since all initiating events and SSCs are included 
in a single model, it is possible to derive the relative importance 
of each of them explicitly and, what is sometimes even more 
important, their interrelations. The same applies 
to the interdependencies between the various levels of defence 
in depth implementation. 
Although the IRIDM is widely regarded as a transparent, 
balanced, logical and consistent process, the limitations of this 
approach have been also indicated here. 
9. The IAEA Safety Glossary 
The IAEA Safety Glossary [30] is used to define and explain 
technical terms used in the paper: 
Acceptance criteria – Specified bounds on the value 
of an indicator – characteristic of a structure, system or component 
that can be observed, measured or trended – used to assess 
the ability of a structure, system or component to perform 
its design function. 
Availability – the fraction of time for which a system is capable 
of fulfilling its intended purpose. 
Common cause failure (CCF) – failure of two or more structures, 
systems and components due to a single specific event or cause. 
Defence in depth (DID) – A hierarchical deployment of different 
levels of diverse equipment and procedures to prevent 
the escalation of anticipated operational occurrences 
and to maintain the effectiveness of physical barriers placed 
between a radiation source or radioactive material and workers, 
members of the public or the environment, in operational states 
and, for some barriers, in accident conditions. 
Design basis accident (DBA) – Accident conditions against which 
a facility is designed according to established design criteria, 
and for which the damage to the fuel and the release of radioactive 
material are kept within authorized limits. 
Licensing process – the authorization process leading to the grant 
of a licence, which is a legal document issued by the regulatory 
body granting authorization to perform specified activities related 
to a facility or activity. 
Multiple barriers – Two or more natural or engineered barriers – 
physical obstacles that prevent or inhibit the movement of people, 
radionuclides or some other phenomenon, or provide shielding 
against radiation – used to isolate radioactive waste in, 
and prevent migration of radionuclides from, a repository. 
Nuclear safety – The achievement of proper operating conditions, 
prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, 
resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment 
from undue radiation hazards. 
Nuclear security – The prevention and detection of, and response 
to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other 
malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive sub-
stances or their associated facilities. 
Operator – Any organization or person applying for authorization 
or authorized and/or responsible for nuclear, radiation, radioactive 
waste or transport safety when undertaking activities or in relation 
to any nuclear facilities or sources of ionizing radiation. 
This includes, inter alia, private individuals, governmental bodies, 
consignors or carriers, licensees, hospitals, self-employed persons. 
Radioactive waste – For legal and regulatory purposes, waste that 
contains, or is contaminated with, radionuclides at concentrations 
or activities greater than clearance levels as established 
by the regulatory body. 
Reliability – probability that a system or component will meet 
its minimum performance requirements when called upon 
to do so. 
Research reactor – A nuclear reactor used mainly 
for the generation and utilization of neutron flux and ionizing 
radiation for research and other purposes, including experimental 
facilities associated with the reactor and storage, handling and 
treatment facilities for radioactive materials on the same site that 
are directly related to safe operation of the research reactor. 
Facilities commonly known as critical assemblies are included. 
Safety analysis – Evaluation of the potential hazards associated 
with the conduct of an activity. 
Safety assessment – Assessment of all aspects of a practice that 
are relevant to protection and safety; for an authorized facility, this 
includes siting, design and operation of the facility. 
Safety function – A specific purpose that must be accomplished 
for safety. 
Safety system – A system important to safety, provided to ensure 
the safe shutdown of the reactor or the residual heat removal from 
the core, or to limit the consequences of anticipated operational 
occurrences and design basis accidents. 
Sensitivity analysis – A quantitative examination of how 
the behaviour of a system varies with change, usually in the values 
of the governing parameters. 
Single failure criterion – A criterion (or requirement) applied 
to a system such that it must be capable of performing its task 
in the presence of any single failure. 
Structures, systems and components (SSCs) – A general term 
encompassing all of the elements (items) of a facility or activity 
which contribute to protection and safety, except human factors. 
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